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I
INTRODUCTION
The main proposal in the current Congress with respect to medical
malpractice is H.R. 30841 (the Moore-Gephardt bill), which was widely
discussed when introduced in the 98th Congress as H.R. 5400.2 The bill
merits support because it cuts through the Gordian knot of tort reform,
motivating medical providers to offer reasonable compensation for
negligently injured patients in exchange for patients' foregoing the
opportunity to pursue what is often the will-o'-the-wisp of tort recovery.
II
THE GENIUS OF SIMPLICITY
The basic idea behind H.R. 3084 is a simple one. In response to the view
that the tort system now wastes money on transactional costs and windfall
recoveries for the few plaintiffs who win the lottery of litigation, the proposal
would rechannel that money toward fairer and faster compensation for more
victims of malpractice. Eligible victims would receive fair payment for actual
pecuniary losses, without the expense, trauma, and delays of litigation.
Patients would exchange the right to sue for noneconomic damages for
prompt, guaranteed payment of out-of-pocket economic losses. The
arrangement would directly benefit both patients and providers and would
give society a more efficient means of compensating victims of malpractice.
The bill is not a no-fault proposal. To the contrary, it retains the central
principle of tort law that compensation should be based on faulty behavior,
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and it would not provide compensation for all bad outcomes occurring in the
course of health care. Given that the provider should not be a guarantor of
the patient's health, however, the question remains what bad events the
provider should pay for. The current tort system resolves that question by
requiring the provider to pay for injuries that a jury determines to be the
result of negligent conduct. Resolving issues of fault, causation, and damages
through the formal adversary process entails the expense, delay, and fortuity
endemic to tort litigation. The challenge is to find an alternative resolution,
short of requiring providers to pay for bad outcomes regardless of
negligence.
The genius of the idea embodied in H.R. 3084 is that it deflects the
question of defining which bad outcomes are covered. It introduces
incentives for providers voluntarily to pay compensation to victims more
quickly than they could recover through litigation and avoids requiring
providers to pay for all adverse outcomes, but does not entail a legislative
delineation of when payment must be made. Under H.R. 3084, compensation
is tied to each provider's assessment of its responsibility. When a provider
concludes that negligence may be found in court, it may commit itself to pay
compensation, based on the injured patient's net economic loss, and thereby
foreclose tort litigation. But if the provider does not do so, a patient still
retains his right to have the provider's liability determined under the current
tort system, subject to full tort damages, including pain and suffering and
other noneconomic damages. The desire to avoid the tort lottery and its
potentially very high payouts-not to mention the cost, distraction, and
unpleasantness of litigation-should motivate providers to make reasonable
offers to settle on the basis of fairer, more controlled, payments.
III
THE MECHANICS OF IMPROVED COMPENSATION
Under the proposal, the payment process would work as follows:3 A
health care provider would have the option within 180 days of an adverse
outcome (that is, one that could give rise to a malpractice action) to make a
commitment to pay the patient's net economic loss resulting from the event.
The patient would be entitled to complete reimbursement of out-of-pocket
losses, such as lost wages and extra medical expenses, less any payment
available to the patient from other third-party sources, such as the patient's
own health insurance. Counseling, pain treatment, and other costs would be
reimbursable. The compensation payments would be made periodically, as
the patient's economic loss accrued, so it would not be necessary for the
3. H.R. 3084 is model legislation for the states to consider. The discussion in this article is
based on the basic federal model. If a state does not pass legislation making reforms similar to those
of H.R. 3084 for all health care provided in the state, H.R. 3084 would become effective for all health
care provided to persons who receive assistance from the federal government in financing that care.
Because of the impact of Medicare, Medicaid, and federal grant programs, this provision would
provide a significant element of reform, even if a state did not act.
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proposal to operate to know or estimate the amounts actually to be covered at
the time the commitment is made.
Once a provider makes such a commitment, the patient's right to pursue a
malpractice claim under the tort system would be terminated, with two
exceptions discussed below. Thus, in exchange for the provider's prompt
assumption of responsibility for economic loss, the patient would lose his or
her legal claim for noneconomic loss. In the absence of such a timely
commitment, the patient could either proceed with a malpractice action
exactly as under current law, or, the bill provides, obtain speedy arbitration of
the issue of the provider's fault (and, if successful, recover net economic loss).
Why would providers make such offers? Because they know the tort
system does not work to their advantage. The opportunity to avoid the tort
lottery is limited to 180 days. Because the outcome itself starts the clock, the
proposal encourages providers to develop measures for identifying possible
malpractice quickly. Under the tort system, providers and their insurers
receive no certain reward for prompt intervention, and may be tempted to
wait for the patient to make a claim, all the while hoping that the problem
never comes to light. Under H.R. 3084, providers and insurers can mitigate
damages only by identifying and acknowledging any malpractice quickly,
informing patients, and taking remedial measures.
In some instances, prompt provider action is impossible because no one
can possibly learn of a negligent injury or because only a patient knows of the
problem. For instance, problem childbirth, erroneous diagnoses, and failure
to provide informed consent may all take time to discover. In such events, the
provider's option to make a payment commitment would be triggered by the
receipt of a claim, rather than by the "event" itself.
The commitment to pay compensation for the patient's net economic loss
as it occurs would be fully enforceable as a matter of law. Net economic loss is
a reasonable standard of compensation, prompt payment of which would
greatly benefit injured patients. It would encompass the actual, out-of-pocket
cost of continued medical and hospital care, rehabilitation, nursing care, wage
loss, housekeeping services, and adapting the patient's house and car, as well
as reasonable attorney fees incurred in advising the patient.4 Further, no
question about the reasonableness of the promise can delay the commitment,
since the qualifying tender is not a fixed estimate of future damages, but a
commitment to pay specified elements of loss in full as they come due.
When one potential defendant makes a commitment under the proposal,
the patient should not retain the right to sue other participants in the same
alleged malpractice. Otherwise, the plaintiff would get the best of both
worlds-prompt payment of out-of-pocket loss without litigation, plus the
ability to sue any or all of the other participants in the alleged wrongdoing for
duplicate damages. If anything, payment from one defendant would enhance
the plaintiff's capacity to hold out against the others. The tort system, with all
4. H.R. 3084 places no limit on the wage loss for which the patient would be reimbursed.
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its faults, would remain essentially unchanged. Insurance premiums could
only continue their rise.
To avoid this result, the bill permits a provider to join other potential
defendants in the commitment to pay the patient's net economic loss. By
doing so, the first provider bars a suit against the others. Similarly, the bill
gives the other potential defendants the right to be included in the
commitment. Thus, if a hospital commits to pay a patient, it may designate a
physician as a cotenderer. A physician tenderer, likewise, may designate the
hospital. Either may also designate, for example, a drug or equipment
manufacturer.
The joint participants could decide among themselves how they will share
the obligation owed to the patient. Since these parties are likely to be
represented by insurance companies that deal with one another on an
ongoing basis, they will in most cases easily agree on their respective shares,
according to private rules of thumb and practiced negotiation. If they cannot
agree, such disputes would go to arbitration to determine the parties'
respective shares on the basis of relative negligence. This procedure not only
can be conducted more expeditiously than under the current litigation
system, but it also can be conducted routinely and privately, among
knowledgeable professionals, rather than in the glare of publicity that can
accompany litigation.
Joining the potential defendants in the commitment makes it unnecessary
for the patient to determine which defendants may be culpable. The victim is
also protected from the evasive mutual finger-pointing that is so common
(and expensive) among various tort defendants. On the other hand, the
victim cannot play one defendant off against another. In sum, the proposal is
elegantly simple: the patient receives just compensation, the participants are
obligated to pay it, and the liability insurers determine the respective shares. 5
How many adverse outcomes could be expected to come under the
proposal? More than under the current tort litigation system, but less than
under proposed no-fault schemes. First, providers and their insurers would
be certain to make offers in all cases of clear liability when there is a
reasonable probability of lawsuit or claim; committing to pay net out-of-
pocket costs is a much better "deal" than paying full damages (including
amounts duplicated by collateral sources), plus pain and suffering, plus the
very high "carrying charges" of the tort litigation system. Moreover,
concerned providers can avoid the enormous personal agony, lost time, and
professional damage of potentially protracted litigation. Second, tenders
should also include cases where liability is less clear. Providers distrust the
litigation process; the prospect of avoiding it will be attractive. Further, even
though concepts of fault will still remain as the determinant of ultimate
liability, providers will be able to present their offer in a nonadversative,
5. Not all commentators agree that this proposal would work so smoothly and inexpensively.
See, e.g., Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in THE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION ON
HEALTH CARE COSTS 28, 34-35 (M. Baily & W. Cikins eds. 1985).
[Vol. 49: No. 2
Page 117: Spring 1986]
healing spirit: "We're not sure exactly what happened or who, if anyone, may
have slipped up, Mrs. Jones, but you clearly have been disadvantaged. So all
of us involved agree to take care of your extra long hospital stay and lost
wages. We trust this will help you recover more rapidly and ease any fears
you may have about meeting your bills in the meantime." Health care
providers often want to take this approach, but the current litigation system
bars them from doing so. The proposal would permit providers to be true to
their caring mission, to their own benefit and that of the patient.
It is important to reemphasize that this is not a no-fault proposal.
Providers are not required to make tenders for any maloccurrence in the
course of health care or even for any defined list of them. The proposal is not
intended, as some commentators have erroneously asserted, to have
providers "routinely ma[k]e settlement offers on a no-fault basis." 6 Rather,
the proposal contemplates that they will make offers when they recognize they
are at fault or when there is a colorable claim of fault that the providers
believe is sufficiently likely to be accepted by the jury to warrant, in light of the
potential recovery, making a tender. Providers and their insurance companies
will make those determinations in the context of a fault-based system for
determining liability and compensation.
A proposal that required providers to make payment for all medical
mishaps or that intended such a result would be inappropriate. It is far less
clear in medicine than in other activities that injury has resulted from lack of
care (poor medical treatment) rather than merely from the normal course of
events (the natural history of the preexisting injury or disease). Under most
circumstances, for example, one expects to navigate the streets safely; if that
expectation is not fulfilled, it is almost invariably the result of an extrinsic act
which should be compensated. No-fault automobile insurance is appropriate
because the insured event (an accident) and subsequent damages are almost
always a direct result of the insured activity (driving or car ownership).
Disease and death, on the other hand, are inevitable-and naturally associated
with medical care. To introduce a no-fault scheme for health care would
require paying compensation for a large number of events that are not now
actionable and are unavoidable in any case. 7
It would also be extremely expensive to require compensation for all bad
events arising out of health care-or even many of them. Any such scheme
would effectively create a very broad health, safety, and life insurance
program-a major social undertaking that would raise numerous problems of
its own. The benefits of such a program would be fortuitous. Those who
became ill or died while under medical care could recover, while those who
died before entering the health care system could not. Sick and injured
people would hasten to involve health care professionals, a practice which
might benefit patients but would also be extremely expensive and require a
6. Id. at 34-35.
7. See, e.g., Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, 128 WJ. MED. 360
(1978).
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massive reallocation of resources.8 Such a broad no-fault approach would not
and should not be popular in Congress, especially under the present fiscal
circumstances.
IV
THE MAINTENANCE OF DETERRENCE
Some commentators have objected that H.R. 3084 would reduce the
deterrence against improper conduct that the tort system now supposedly
provides. 9 This fear is misguided for several reasons. First, today's insured
malpractice system provides precious little deterrence as it is. The great
majority of malpractice payments are not made by the tortfeasor, but by
liability insurers that seldom adjust rates individually in response to an
insured's conduct. Second, any deterrence that exists currently would remain
under the proposal. Only by guaranteeing payment of an injured patient's net
economic loss-not an insignificant commitment-can a provider foreclose a
malpractice claim (and even then not in every case). Fault-based tort rules
would continue to set the basic framework of responsibility. Third,
professional pride, the mission to serve patients and earn the esteem of one's
peers, and the threat of peer review or disciplinary proceedings are all
effective deterrents to malpractice-none of which the proposal would in any
way reduce. If anything, professional self-review would be enhanced by the
incentive to uncover potentially actionable occurrences within 180 days.
Finally, by enacting workers' compensation and automobile no-fault laws,
society has already abandoned liability rules based on fault for whole sectors
of modern life, apparently without any adverse effects on people's desire to
avoid negligence. There is no reason to believe that health care would prove
different. In fact, there are more nontort protections that ensure the quality
of health care than there are in other areas in which the fault concept has been
abandoned. Thus, there is little cause for concern about maintaining
whatever deterrence now comes from the antiquated tort-plus-malpractice-
insurance system.
V
SPECIAL RULES FOR UNUSUAL CASES?
Under H.R. 3084, a provider commitment would not terminate a
malpractice claim when a patient died from the treatment or when the
provider's malpractice was intentional; the most serious cases would thus be
dealt with through use of the current system. Many advocates of the proposal,
however, believe that there should not be an exception for death.
8. See Danzon, supra note 5, at 35.
9. Alternative Medical Liability Act: Hearings on H.R. 5400 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, 102 (1984)(statement of Patricia Nemore, staff
attorney, National Senior Citizens Center); id. at 103, 106 (statement of Judith Waxman, staff
attorney, National Health Law Program); id. at 169, 171 (statement of Melvin Nevitt, American
Association of Retired Persons).
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In other instances, a serious injury may result from malpractice but may
entail little or no economic injury (particularly if there is compensation from
other sources). For instance, a lawyer who loses an arm can still practice law
and is probably well-covered for temporary loss of earnings and extra medical
bills. Arguably, providers should not pay less for such injuries, as they do
under the proposal, because the noneconomic damages (such as loss of
quality of life) remain high and because economic damage was only
fortuitously avoided. Nonetheless, H.R. 3084 declines to make an exception
for these unusual circumstances. A commitment to pay economic loss
forecloses a suit for noneconomic damages, even in these cases. Objective
need for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses is the most important
element of compensation. To make an exception and permit a patient to
recover in some cases (if the cases could be defined) inevitably would open up
the proposal to undue expansion through an ever-growing loophole for
seemingly sympathetic circumstances.
The question presented is whether society should provide compensation
for noneconomic losses. Few victims of misfortune receive payment even of
their pecuniary losses-which is exactly what the bill would motivate
providers to guarantee as a condition of foreclosing a tort action. The bill
represents a balance. Compared with today's system, it would provide more
compensation for pecuniary loss, more promptly paid, for more victims of
malpractice, with far lower transaction costs and hence lower insurance
charges per case.
To achieve all this on a voluntary basis, however (since providers are not
obligated to commit), savings must be wrung out of the present system by
reducing the amount of litigation and the amount paid on various theories of
noneconomic injury. Making an exception to permit individuals to bring suit
and to collect noneconomic damages in addition to their economic loss would
reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the savings available to pay more victims for
their economic loss, and would certainly remove providers' incentive to
commit and thereby stay out of court. Nevertheless, if the societal decision is
that noneconomic losses should be compensated in some cases, the proposal
could be modified to do so.
One approach would be to allow suit when it would be deemed
unconscionable to bar the patient from noneconomic damages.
"Unconscionability" could be judged by the standard that judges use to set
aside, on the basis of fraud, settlements of liability claims that were voluntarily
made. If a court found that the payment of benefits under the proposal plus
the amounts payable by collateral sources was so inadequate that it would
have set aside a settlement on those terms, the court would allow a
subsequent tort claim for noneconomic damages despite the existing
commitment to pay economic loss.
Another approach would give the patient an option in all cases to accept or
reject a commitment to pay pecuniary losses. A patient who rejected the offer
would not be permitted to sue for compensation of economic loss, which he
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or she had just turned down, but could seek payment only for other,
noneconomic damages. This option could also include a ceiling on allowable
noneconomic damages. Such a cap would be more likely to withstand
constitutional challenge since it would be part of a comprehensive reform
scheme which offers substantial benefits to patients as a class, in contrast to an
across-the-board limitation on tort recovery, which gives no benefits to the
patient, forcing him to undertake litigation while also limiting the amount of
recoverable damages.
Some commentators have also argued that an injured patient should be
able to require that a provider promise payments.' 0 Although it is
superficially plausible to reason that the decision to cover actual pecuniary
damages should not be solely one-sided, the idea could not work in practice.
Like the broad no-fault approach already discussed, a patient-initiated
provider commitment would degenerate into a national health and safety
insurance program, all financed through doctor and hospital bills.
To answer this point, H.R. 3084 contains a mechanism not included in the
prior bill. It gives patients some additional power, when a provider does not
make a tender, by allowing them to seek binding and expeditious arbitration
of whether the provider was responsible. If the patient demonstrates the
provider's fault, he or she could collect net economic loss, as if a tender had
been made, but would not receive any noneconomic recovery. To try for the
"big score" of full tort damages, a dissatisfied patient would have to eschew
arbitration and submit to the full panoply and all the delays of the tort
litigation system itself.
VI
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the present system for compensating victims of
malpractice fails to serve its intended purposes. It is unfair to patients and
providers alike, and burdensome to society as a whole. Litigation is not a
humane or efficient way to compensate victims of malpractice. The federal
government has a leadership role to play in encouraging reform. Because it
funds a large portion of the nation's expenditures for health care, it also has a
direct financial interest. As a proposed federal response to the malpractice
insurance crisis, H.R. 3084 provides a model for the states to consider which
would become law with respect to beneficiaries of federal programs if states
do not respond. It offers a better alternative. Without abandoning the
salutary principle that compensation for medical injuries should be based on
fault, the bill would encourage providers to compensate patients who are
injured by malpractice and to compensate them quickly and without litigation.
10. E.g., id: at 101 (statement of Patricia Nemore).
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